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I. Introduction 
1. Images, witnesses and other numerous sources with evidential value 
accredit the practices that have been coined as “hot returns” in the cities of Ceuta 
and Melilla and the small islands under Spanish sovereignty. 
In this context, the concept of expulsions or “hot returns” by the law 
enforcement authorities3 is being formed, which consists of handing the foreign 
citizens who have been intercepted by such authorities in the area under Spanish 
sovereignty over to the Moroccan authorities on a de facto basis without carrying 
out the legally established procedures or meeting the internationally acknowledged 
guarantees.  
Therefore, the term “hot returns” is applicable whether such practices are 
carried out affecting the people intercepted when they are climbing over the border 
fences that separate Ceuta and Melilla from Morocco, have entered those cities by 
sea or have reached one of the islands under Spanish sovereignty near the 
Moroccan coast, to mention the cases where such practices have been recorded. 
“Hot returns” have also been accredited in cases regarding people who were 
undoubtedly inside the city. This report’s conclusions are also applicable to those 
expulsions insofar they have been carried out without using any legal channel. 
 2. Apart from the following legal considerations, we must state right from 
the start that what is at stake is the effective validity of human rights and respect to 
our most sacred ethical and cultural heritage. The international legal protection has 
established that every person is an end in him/herself, worthy of protection and 
owner of his/her inalienable rights. However, any kind of short-sighted legal 
pragmatism can make us forget that the treatment of the other, the different one, 
is the final proof of the values that sustain a civilisation and the regulatory system 
that it embodies. Specifically, the treatment of foreigners has always been the 
natural way of validating a culture’s moral and legal stature. From an ethical 
standpoint, a restrictive reading of rights, the interpretations that are not aimed at 
their gradual expansion and universality and, obviously, those that breach the 
regulations that we have established in this respect remove us from civilisation and 
lead us to barbarism. Human rights as such must form the cornerstone for the 
gradual moral progress of humanity. However, they will always be “on the side-
lines”. That is why they require that citizens, and particularly jurists, should have a 
critical view of the minimalist re-readings of their substantial content and take a 
position regarding the actions carried out outside the law, especially when they 
come from the public power that put real human beings, who have lived awful 
stories of suffering and injustice, in an extremely vulnerable situation. 
 3. Returning to the legal issues of this problem, this report is aimed at (I) 
establishing  that “hot returns” breach the immigration legislation (II) and the lack 
of a legal basis of the Spanish Ministry of the Interior’s attempts to justify the “hot 
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returns” based on the concept of an “operational” border (III), the irregular entry 
through unauthorised border posts (IV) and the agreement between Spain and 
Morocco regarding the circulation of people, transit and readmission of foreigners 
who enter illegally (V). Likewise, this report sets out the reasons why a possible 
reform of the immigration legislation to provide legal coverage to these types of 
practices would contravene EU regulations and international human rights law, 
which would expressly discredit them (VI). This report ends with reflections about 
the criminal implications for those who order, execute or allow “hot returns” (VII) 
and a section on conclusions (VIII). 
II. “Hot returns” breach the immigration legislation  
1. “Hot returns” breach Constitutional Law 4/2000, of 11 January, on the 
rights and freedoms of foreigners in Spain and their social integration (hereinafter, 
LOEx) and Royal Decree 557/2011, of 20 April, which approves its regulation 
(hereinafter, RLOEx), since this practice does not meet any of the procedures 
envisaged in those regulations. 
2. Spain’s immigration legislation distinguishes three circumstances in this 
issue: expulsions in the strictest sense (A); refusal of entry (B); and returns (C). 
A) Expulsions 
Article 57 of the LOEx envisages, within the sanctions system for foreigners4, 
the possibility of expelling foreigners from Spanish territory under certain 
circumstances. Regarding the purpose of this report, article 53.1.a) of the LOEx 
establishes that a serious breach is committed by a person who is irregularly on 
Spanish territory when he/she lacks the authorisation to stay or reside in Spain. 
Article 57.1 of the LOEx states that, with respect to this breach, “the expulsion from 
Spanish territory can be applied based on the principle of proportionality, instead of 
a fine, after the corresponding administrative file is processed and a reasoned 
resolution is made that assesses the facts that constitute the breach”. 
Therefore, a foreigner who is on Spanish territory and lacks the due 
authorisation for this is committing an administrative breach which, after the 
corresponding administrative sanction file is processed, can lead to his/her 
expulsion from Spanish territory. 
B) Refusal of entry 
Article 26.2 of the LOEx establishes, in relation to the people who try to enter 
Spain through the authorised border posts, that “the foreigners who do not meet 
the entry requirements shall be refused entry through a reasoned resolution, with 
information about the appeals that they can file against this decision, the deadline 
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for doing so and the authority where they must formalise  it, and of their right to 
legal assistance, which can be provided free of charge through the legal aid system, 
and to an interpreter, which shall start at the time that the control is made at the 
border post”. This legal regime is set out in greater detail in article 15 of the RLOEx. 
Therefore, this administrative activity, which is known under several names 
(returns, prohibition of entry, refusal at the border, etc.), is not a penalty and is 
carried out when foreigners cannot enter Spanish territory through the authorised 
border posts  on account of not meeting the requirements envisaged in the 
immigration legislation. 
C)  Returns 
Article 58.3.b) of the LOEx states that “no expulsion file is required for 
returning the foreigners in the following circumstances: (…) b) those who plan to 
illegally enter the country”, and article 23.1.b) of the RLOEx states that “foreigners 
who are intercepted at the border or in its vicinity shall be considered to be included 
for such purposes”. 
On the other hand, article 23.2 of the RLOEx establishes that, in these 
circumstances, the “law enforcement authorities in charge of guarding the coastline 
and borders upon the interception of foreigners who plan to illegally enter Spain 
shall take them to the corresponding police station as soon as possible so that they 
can be identified and, where applicable, returned”. That administrative decision to 
return them must be adopted by a resolution from the Government Sub-Delegate or 
from the Government Delegate in the one-province autonomous regions (article 
23.1 of the RLOEx) and requires that the guarantees stated in article 23.3 of the 
RLOEx be observed: legal assistance and an interpreter if they do not understand or 
speak the official languages. 
Therefore, that administrative activity, which is not a sanction either, is 
carried out when foreigners who are intercepted at the border or in its vicinity plan 
to enter Spain through an area that has not been authorised for this. 
3. In accordance with the foregoing: 
(a) The immigration legislation does not envisage the possibility for the law 
enforcement authorities to expel foreign citizens under their custody outside 
Spanish territory on a de facto basis. 
(b) Foreign citizens who try to enter Spanish territory through unauthorised 
posts and are intercepted at the border or in its vicinity can be returned, at most, in 
accordance with the provisions in article 58.3.b) of the LOEx. 
(c) Such a devolution is an administrative action which is not a penalty 
proceeding, and requires a number of requisites such as the fact that (i) these 
foreign citizens must be taken to a police station (of the national police force), (ii) a 
lawyer must be appointed for them, (iii) where applicable, an interpreter must be 
provided for them, (iv) these citizens must be identified, (v) a resolution for their 
devolution must be issued by the Government Sub-Delegate or Delegate, where 
applicable, and (vi) the devolution itself must be carried out by the national police 
force. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that the “hot returns” are being used in the 
circumstances when at least the devolution procedure should be used, so handing 
these citizens over to the Moroccan authorities on a de facto basis directly breaches 
the provisions of the immigration legislation. 
4. Although the persons responsible for the Ministry of the Interior are aware 
that the “hot returns” do not have a legal backing, they are trying to justify them 
with different arguments such as the fact that (i) the foreign citizens have not 
entered Spanish territory based to this end on a  concept of an “operational” 
border; (ii) it is not necessary to carry out any formalities to expel foreign citizens 
who try to enter Spanish territory irregularly through unauthorised posts; and (iii) 
such practices are backed by the agreement between Spain and Morocco regarding 
the circulation of people, the transit and the readmission of foreigners who have 
entered irregularly. As we will analyse in the following sections, such arguments do 
not have any legal grounds.  
 
III. “Hot returns” and the concept of an “operational” border 
1. The Ministry of the Interior’s first argument to justify the “hot returns” is 
based on the idea that this action is a refusal of entry of foreign citizens who have 
tried to enter Spain through an unauthorised post, and thus have never entered 
Spanish territory. This idea uses the concept of an “operational” border (A) which, 
however, cannot be legally applicable (B). 
A) The concept of an “operational” border used by the Ministry of the 
Interior: 
The best example of the concept of an “operational” border used by the 
Ministry of the Interior can be seen in the Report dated 8 February 2014, drafted by 
the Deputy Operations Division of the Civil Guard and addressed to its Director 
General, in relation to the events that took place on the Ceuta border on 6 February 
2014 and which was submitted by the Ministry of the Interior to the Spanish 
Parliament on 7 March 2014. According to that report, there would be three types of 
actions by the Civil Guard in relation to the attempts to access Spanish territory 
through unauthorised posts from Morocco where a different concept of 
“operational” border could be applied. They were as follows: 
(a) When the migrants try to access Spanish territory directly by sea, “since 
leaving migrants drifting at sea is impossible as well as illegal, plus the fact that their 
physical integrity is seriously endangered, the ordinary protocol of the other 
national, insular or peninsular coastlines is applied in such cases, which consists of, 
firstly, rescuing them and, secondly, applying the general immigration regime, as 
has always been done”. There is nothing to object in this area. 
(b) The aforementioned report does not include the cases when the migrants 
reached the Ceuta beach from Moroccan territory by bordering the breakwater that 
separates the border between Spain and Morocco. According to the report, “to 
prevent the danger to the physical integrity of those swimming around the 
breakwater, the Civil Guard boats do not usually intercept them on the imaginary 
border on the sea, since this could make them drown; the consolidated practice is 
for the civil guards to monitor the safety of the swimmers on their boats and 
intercept them on the adjacent beach waterline with a barrier of agents who form 
the border for practical purposes”. In other words, as a result of “a free and 
sovereign decision”, the border is moved backwards to the place where the law 
enforcement authorities can contain the migrants and refuse their entry, and the 
border “is materialised and made visible by the line of agents that is established, in 
each case and under each circumstance, between the breakwater and the waterline 
that is deemed necessary”. 
(c) When entry is attempted by climbing over the fence, “the internal fence 
materialises the border that the State, in a free and sovereign decision, delimits as 
its national territory for the sole purpose of the immigration regime”. Based on this, 
only the migrants who climb over the internal fence “reach Spanish territory and, 
for such purposes, they are subject to the general immigration regime”. This idea is 
maintained to justify applying the “hot returns” to the migrants who try to climb 
over the fence but whom, for example, after climbing the external fence, are 
trapped in the three-dimensional wire maze between the external and internal 
fence. 
B) The “operational” concept is legally inadmissible: 
The idea that a hypothetical border can be created by a line formed by Civil 
Guard agents on a Spanish beach or by the internal fence in the cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla in the areas where there are two fences, where foreign citizens enter 
Spanish territory only if they cross the line of agents or the internal fence, is not 
legally admissible. This concept of an “operational” border lacks legal grounds (a) 
and forgets that in their attempt to enter Spanish territory they will be intercepted 
by the law enforcement authorities in any case and will remain in their custody in 
Spanish territory (b). 
(a) The borders are established by the international rules that are mandatory 
for all the countries while the border posts are established by the general internal 
legal rules. Based on those regulations, any Spanish beach, including those of the 
cities of Ceuta and Melilla, are undoubtedly Spanish territory, just like the seashore 
of those beaches are areas subject to Spanish sovereignty since they are either 
internal waters, because they are within the baselines used to delimit the territorial 
waters, or territorial waters. In the same way, it is well known that the external 
fence that delimits those cities from Morocco in certain areas and which was 
erected at first by the Spanish government was built on Spanish territory. 
On the other hand, there are no laws that grant legal basis to a border 
concept that can be determined whimsically on an ad casu basis which breaches, 
among other essential principles, the prohibition of arbitrariness and legal certainty 
(article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution). It is not legally acceptable to defend the 
argument that the government can change at its own free will and “through a free 
and sovereign decision” the limits of the national territory even if, as the text states, 
this is done “for the sole purpose of the immigration law”. The argument lacks legal 
grounds and it cannot be defended in theory, and this legal fiction cannot be 
sustained based on the contingent and vague “practical effects” stated by the 
Administration to avoid meeting its legally imposed obligations and restrict the 
rights acknowledged to foreign citizens in the immigration legislation. 
Therefore, under such circumstances, the specific way in which the Ministry 
of the Interior argues its border concept could have very serious consequences in 
international law since it has direct effects on the concept of territory under Spanish 
sovereignty. Apart from this, the legal uncertainty increases since the criterion used 
for delimiting the border does not explain to what extent the border that delimits 
the territory under Spanish sovereignty can be moved backwards. 
For such purposes, we must remember the Ombudsman’s 2005 Report, 
which stated as follows: “it is not up to the Spanish Administration to determine 
where the legislation that governs Spain starts to be applicable. Such territorial 
application is governed by the international treaties or, where applicable, by the 
international custom that establishes the limits with the neighbouring states. The 
laws may also establish the territorial delimitations so that they are in force, but this 
power corresponds, under Spanish law, to the legislative power, which must be 
subject to the constitutional rules in any case. In the case at hand, there are no rules 
in the legal provisions that regulate foreigners’ access to Spanish territory that 
allow an exception of the full application of the Spanish law to a portion of the 
national territory. Therefore, the Ombudsman believes that the Administration’s 
explanation that it can determine where to place the obstacles to be surpassed in 
order to consider when Spanish territory has been entered cannot be deemed as 
correct. Entry into Spanish territory is made when the internationally established 
limits have been crossed and, in this case, the only applicable law is the Spanish 
one” (page 292). 
(b) The acts by public powers are subject to the Spanish Constitution and the 
other laws of the legal system (article 9.1 of the Constitution) and this is not only the 
case when the activity of such powers is carried out in the area under Spanish 
sovereignty but   they are also subject to the law simply because such activity is 
carried out by Spanish civil servants performing their duties (Constitutional Court 
judgment 21/1997 of 10 February, Legal Basis paragraph 2). 
This was also stated by the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, 
ECtHR) regarding the application of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter, ECHR), whereby “whenever the State through its agents operating 
outside its territory exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that 
individual the rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are 
relevant to the situation of that individual” (European Court of Human Rights 
judgment of 27 February 2012, case of Hirsi Jamaa and others vs. Italy, section 74). 
In this way, apart from the considerations about whether the activity carried 
out by the law enforcement authorities in these situations takes place before or 
after foreign citizens enter areas under Spanish sovereignty, it is undoubted that 
they do this as civil servants and while performing their duties. Therefore, they are 
subject to the duty of strictly complying with the Spanish Constitution and other 
laws of the legal system, and any migration control procedures must be subject to 
the immigration legislation. Moreover, apart from the aforementioned legal fiction, 
the actions coined as “hot returns” are materialised in the handing over of foreign 
citizens by Spanish civil servants to the authorities of a third country from Spanish 
territory. 
This was also stated in the Ombudsman’s aforementioned 2005 Report: “it 
must be remembered that the actions carried out by the civil servants of the 
Spanish law enforcement authorities , inside and outside our territory, and 
specifically in the neutral areas that separate Ceuta and Melilla from Moroccan 
territory, are also regulated by Spanish law” (page 292). 
2. In accordance with the foregoing: 
(a) The concepts of border and territorial area under sovereignty are strictly 
legal and regulated in the corresponding regulations. Based on those regulations, 
the beaches of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the areas where the external and 
internal fences that separate them from Morocco are located are Spanish territory, 
where Spain can fully exercise its sovereignty.  
(b) The concepts of an “operational” border, based on the fiction that there 
is an imaginary line formed by the Civil Guard agents on the Spanish beaches would 
delimit the area of territorial sovereignty or that Spanish sovereignty starts when 
the internal protection fence is crossed in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla lacks legal 
grounds. 
(c) Any actions by the Administration inside or outside Spanish territory are 
carried out by Spanish civil servants when performing their duties subject to the 
Spanish Constitution and other laws in the legal system. In this sense, even if it is 
accepted that the foreign citizens were intercepted outside Spanish territory, the 
“hot returns” are not excluded from the immigration legislation since the foreign 
citizens are handed over by Spanish authorities from Spanish territory to the 
authorities of a third country. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that the concept of an “operational” border 
used by the Ministry of the Interior is not legally admissible to sustain the lawfulness 
of the “hot returns”. 
 IV. “Hot returns” and irregular access through an unauthorised border post 
1. The Ministry of the Interior’s second argument to justify the “hot returns” 
is based on the idea that it can expel, on a de facto basis and without the need to 
use any procedures, any person who is anywhere in Spanish territory, provided that 
they have entered irregularly, since only those who have entered through 
authorised border posts are in national territory. 
This theory abounds in the controversial creation of legal limbos and it is not 
only not included in the immigration legislation but it has been expressly banned by 
the Spanish Supreme Court, which sustains that, in these cases, rather than 
devolution proceedings, sanction proceedings must be initiated which, where 
applicable, will lead to an expulsion sanction. 
2. In the small hours of 20 June 2000, the Civil Guard agents intercepted a van 
in Mijas (Malaga) with 37 Moroccan citizens, suspected of having disembarked 
shortly before, somewhere along the Spanish coastline between Tarifa and Malaga 
and who were heading to settle in the Murcia region. Devolution proceedings were 
applied to them so that they could return to their country of origin, rather than 
administrative sanction proceedings, which would have enabled their expulsion. In 
its Consultation 1/2001 of 9 May, the Public Prosecutor stated that this decision was 
in line with the law in force since “the fact that the migrants were caught with 
unequivocal signs that they had immediately beforehand committed an 
administrative breach, consisting of the illegal entry into Spanish territory, justifies 
considering that this conduct is that included among those (…) which allow the 
return of those who have been arrested when they are trying to enter Spain.” 
By virtue of this doctrine from the Public Prosecutor, the Spanish 
government included in article 138 of Royal Decree 864/2001, of 20 July, which 
approved the Regulations for Executing the Immigration Law, when defining the 
circumstances for devolutions, that these proceedings would be applicable “(…) to 
foreigners who are intercepted at the border, in its vicinity or inside Spanish 
territory, in transit or en route, if they did not meet the entry requirements”. 
3. As a result of the appeal filed against the unlawfulness of certain 
provisions of that Regulation, the judgment from the Supreme Court’s 
Administrative Division of 20 March 2003, issued in appeal no. 488/2001, declared 
that the provision was null and void. It stated that, considering that article 58.3.b) of 
the LOEx reserves the devolution proceedings only to those who plan to enter 
Spain illegally, extending this regulation and applying these proceedings to those 
who are already inside Spanish territory in transit or en route, without meeting the 
entry requirements, is beyond the legal framework of the LOEx and is null and void. 
The argument was that “on the other hand, it is evident that those who are inside 
Spanish territory, even if they are en route or in transit, do not plan to enter since 
this is incompatible with “being inside”, i.e. inside Spanish territory”. Therefore, this 
is an “extended interpretation that goes beyond the legal mandate by extending it 
to a case that is not envisaged in it. Therefore, it is an interpretation that 
contravenes the law which applies an exceptional regime that does not have the 
guarantees of the expulsion proceedings in cases other than those legally 
established” (Legal Basis paragraph18). 
 This case law was ratified subsequently by a judgment from the Supreme 
Court’s Administrative Division on 8 January 2007, issued in appeal no. 38/2005 
(Legal Basis paragraph 12). By virtue of this, as stated above, the wording of article 
23.1.b) of the RLOEx, which is currently in force, omitted any references to the 
current controversial cases  of intercepting foreign citizens who are already inside 
Spanish territory, in transit or en route, and do not meet the entry requirements. 
 4. In accordance with the foregoing: 
(a) The presence of foreign citizens inside Spanish territory who have 
entered irregularly through an unauthorised post was defended at the start in the 
Public Prosecutor’s Circular 1/2001 of 9 May and enshrined in article 138 of Royal 
Decree 864/2001 of 20 July as one of the cases when the devolution proceedings, 
and not the expulsion ones, were applicable. 
 (b) That theory was declared null and void and was fully banned by a 
judgment from the Supreme Court’s Administrative Division on 20 March 2003, 
issued in appeal no. 488/2001, which stated that, in this type of case, the 
proceedings legally established for enabling, where applicable, foreign citizens to 
return to their countries of origin or provenance were the administrative sanction 
proceedings for an irregular stay in the country. 
 Therefore, the conclusion is that the interception in Spanish territory of 
people who have entered Spain irregularly through an unauthorised post does not 
justify applying the so-called “hot returns”. Conversely, in accordance with the 
Supreme Court case law on this issue, the expulsion proceedings are applicable in 
these cases, with their inherent guarantees. 
 
V. “Hot returns” and the Spain-Morocco readmission agreement 
1. The Ministry of the Interior’s third argument to justify the “hot returns” is 
based on the Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of 
Morocco regarding the circulation of people, the transit and the readmission of 
foreigners who enter illegally, signed in Madrid on 13 February 1992. The provisional 
application of this Agreement was published in the BOE (Official State Gazette) no. 
100 of 25 April 1992 and its final entry into force was on 21 October 2012, in 
accordance with the statement included in the BOE no. 299 of 13 December 2012. 
 However, that Agreement does not provide sufficient legal grounds for the 
so-called “hot returns” to the detriment of applying the proceedings established in 
the immigration legislation. Also, its provisions do not justify handing over foreign 
citizens to the Moroccan authorities on a de facto basis. 
2. The Spain-Morocco readmission agreement and the immigration legislation 
do not coincide in their regulatory purpose. They are applied successively but they 
do not regulate the same administrative activity that is to be carried out by the 
Spanish authorities in any case. The immigration legislation establishes the 
proceedings by virtue of which a foreign citizen can be subject of a coercive exit 
from Spanish territory. On the other hand, the readmission agreement regulates the 
way in which this coactive exit must be made when the destination is Morocco. Only 
when  the Spanish administrative authorities have made the decision to return a 
foreign citizen after applying the immigration legislation can the readmission 
agreements, whether they are bilateral ones signed by Spain or multilateral ones 
signed by the European Union, be used to materially hand the citizen over to the 
authorities of a third country.  
 In this context, it is obvious that, because of the different subject under 
regulation, the Spain-Morocco readmission agreement cannot be the legal grounds 
for providing an exception to the administrative authorities regarding the 
proceedings established in the immigration legislation with respect to the decision 
to hand over foreign citizens who have entered Spanish territory irregularly and 
been intercepted by the law enforcement authorities. 
 3. On the other hand, the Spain-Morocco readmission agreement does not 
justify the so-called “hot returns” in the way that they are being carried out by the 
Ministry of the Interior. That agreement establishes a number of obligations that 
Spain is not complying with. For example, article 1 requires a formal request from 
the border authorities of the requesting State, which must include “all the available 
identity details, the personal documentation that the foreigner may have and how 
they illegally entered the territory of the requesting State, as well as any other 
information about him or her that may be available” (paragraph two of article 2). 
Likewise, it is stated that “when the readmission is accepted, this is documented in 
a certificate or any other document issued by the border authorities of the 
requested State, stating the identity and, where applicable, the documents the 
foreigner may have in his/her possession” (paragraph three of article 2). 
 In that sense, even leaving aside the obligations arising from the immigration 
legislation, the Agreement itself establishes other reciprocal obligations on how to 
carry out the handing over which, (just as the identification and individualisation of 
the persons handed over, or the written documentation of the handing over), 
exclude any type of administrative actions on a de facto basis. 
 4. In accordance with the foregoing: 
 (a) The Spain-Morocco readmission agreement and the immigration 
legislation have a different regulatory scope which affects different actions of the 
Spanish Administration. The immigration legislation establishes the procedures for 
adopting the decisions whereby foreign citizens must exit Spanish territory. The 
readmission agreement regulates the way in which such exit decisions are executed 
when Morocco is the destination. 
 (b) The Spain-Morocco readmission agreement establishes a detailed 
procedure on how to hand over the foreign citizens and this implies reciprocal 
obligations for the authorities of the signatory countries, such as identifying the 
foreign citizens to be handed over and the written document of the handing over 
itself. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that the Spain-Morocco readmission agreement 
does not justify applying the so-called “hot returns” since it cannot make an 
exception, based on the issues it regulates, to applying the procedures established 
in the immigration legislation. Conversely, that Agreement establishes new 
obligations on how to hand over the foreign citizens, which are also not being 
complied with. 
 
VI. The impossibility of providing legal basis to “hot returns”: breach of the 
European regulations and international law. 
1. The so-called “hot returns” are not only incompatible with Spanish law 
but they also contravene EU regulations and international human rights law. 
Therefore, the Ministry of the Interior’s plan as stated in several occasions to 
provide legal basis to them is unfeasible.  
2. Human rights are the conquest of dignity against barbarism and a 
milestone that requires continuous advances in raising its awareness, in including 
them in positive law and, above all, in ensuring  that the achievements in this area 
are respected by developing mechanisms to ensure that they are effective and that 
their offenders are legally persecuted and punished. The Spanish State has ratified a 
multitude of international agreements which make it impossible for it to legitimise 
practices that manifestly breach peoples’ fundamental rights. The Spanish 
Constitution itself includes the requirement of an interpretation of the fundamental 
rights in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other 
international agreements that develop and implement them (article 10.2 of the 
Spanish Constitution). 
In that sense, the immigration legislation requirements regarding the need to 
give an opportunity to the foreign citizens intercepted by the Spanish authorities so 
that they can state their circumstances arise from the compliance with the 
international obligations on human rights. These people can be minors, victims of 
trafficking for sexual exploitation or other purposes, or girls who flee from forced 
marriages or female genital mutilation. Likewise, they can also be refugees, or they 
can be people fleeing from war or persecution. The protection needs of vulnerable 
people and groups such as the aforementioned is what has led to the development 
and signature of international agreements that recognise and develop guarantees 
that can defend their indemnity. That is why the immigration legislation of the most 
developed countries, including Spain, envisages that not all irregular entries into 
their territories will have the consequence of return precisely as a response to the 
circumstances that require greater protection standards (articles 31 of the LOEx and 
23.6 of the RLOEx). 
3. This report is not aimed at analysing the EU and international regulations 
that are being breached with these “hot returns”. However, it is necessary to refer 
to at least the right to asylum and international protection which, as is well known, 
is the protection that must be given to the refugees who flee from persecution or 
who escape from situations of indiscriminate violence. 
For such purposes, Law 12/2009, of 30 October, which regulates the right to 
asylum and  subsidiary protection, states that asylum is the protection that is given 
to refugees and that this status is given to “any person who, owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political 
opinions, membership to a particular social group, gender or sexual orientation, is 
outside the country of nationality and cannot or, because of such fears, does not 
want to avail him/herself of the  protection from that country” (article 3). Together 
with asylum, the law includes the right to subsidiary protection which, according to 
article 4, is granted to persons who do not have refugee status but for whom there 
are founded reasons that, if they return to their country of nationality, or of their 
last residence in the case of stateless persons, their life and integrity will seriously 
be endangered under the terms envisaged in article 10 of that Law. An example of 
subsidiary protection is referred to persons who do not suffer a specific and 
individual persecution in their country (the requirement for asylum), but who 
cannot return to their country without their lives being seriously endangered 
because, for example, there is a war or indiscriminate violence. 
Insofar as “hot returns” prevent any allegations or individual treatments of 
the foreign citizens who are intercepted, they make it impossible to exercise the 
right to asylum. Therefore, they  not only breach Law 12/2009, which regulates this, 
but also article 13 of the Spanish Constitution, which acknowledges this right, as 
well as the international commitments signed by Spain, as the signatory of the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
Protocol of 31 January 1967, and the EU regulations, which also guarantee the full 
exercise of this right in article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (hereinafter, the Charter). 
Therefore, any future reform of the immigration legislation to provide legal 
protection to the “hot returns”, insofar as this makes it impossible to exercise the 
right to asylum, would find the unbeatable obstacle of its unconstitutionality and 
would contradict international and EU law. 
4. Likewise, since the “hot returns” do not individualise, identify or document 
the foreign citizens handed over to the Moroccan authorities, they would also be 
included under the prohibited collective expulsions. 
Article 19.1 of the Charter prohibits collective expulsions. This prohibition not 
only bans the current Spanish practice of “hot returns” but it also prevents any 
intention to provide a legal basis to this type of action in a reform of the 
immigration legislation, since its determining feature is not that it falls on a more or 
less numerous group of people (a merely quantitative criterion) but that it does not 
guarantee the possibility of making allegations or recording who the expelled 
person is or if the person needs any special protection (a qualitative criterion). 
Likewise, article 19.2 of the Charter states the “principle of non-refoulement”. 
In accordance with this provision, “no one may be removed, expelled or extradited 
to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the 
death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. 
This right does not seem to be able to be included in the general exceptions of 
article 52.1 of the Charter, i.e. no collective expulsions can be carried out for reasons 
of general interest or for the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. In 
relation to this provision, the content of the reports from international 
organisations and bodies, which doubt Morocco’s respect for the human rights of 
migrants, especially from Sub-Saharan Africa, must also be taken into consideration 
when prohibiting the group expulsions to Morocco and making sure that the 
returns that are made subject to the immigration legislation are carried out after an 
individual and reasoned analysis of each file to guarantee the “principle of non-
refoulement”. Morocco’s guarantees about the appropriate treatment and the 
requirement of the bilateral agreement with Morocco whereby  it undertakes to 
ensure that the migrants reach their destination require, from the viewpoint of the 
minimum standards for protecting the effectiveness of human rights, detailed 
monitoring that has yet to be applied. 
5. On the other hand, although the ECHR does not expressly refer to the right 
to asylum, the ECtHR’s interpretation of its article 3, which establishes the 
prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
includes the prohibition to expel foreigners to a country where there are sufficient 
reasons to consider that the expelled person may be subjected to torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment. Therefore, the case law includes the principle of 
“non-refoulement” and, although it has been applied to different cases of expulsion 
or deportation of asylum seekers (European Court of Human Rights judgments of 11 
January 2007, case of Salah Sheekh vs. The Netherlands; of 23 February 2012, case of 
Hirsi Jamaa and others vs. Italy; and of 19 December 2013, case of N.K. vs. France), it is 
applicable to any case of expulsion since  States have the obligation to ensure the 
treatment that the migrants will receive when they return to their countries of 
origin or provenance (European Court of Human Rights judgments of 5 May 2009, 
case of Selle vs. Italy; and of 3 December 2009, case of Daoudi vs. France). 
Within the framework of the Convention, collective expulsions are also 
prohibited, expressly in article 4 of Protocol 4, which purpose, as established by the 
ECtHR, is to make sure that no foreigners are expelled without their situation being 
examined on an individual basis and after having the opportunity to plead their 
arguments (European Court of Human Rights judgments of 5 February 2002, case of 
Conka vs. Belgium; and of 23 February 2012, case of Hirsi Jamaa and others vs. Italy). 
Likewise, the procedural guarantee of the right to an effective remedy would 
be breached (article 13 of the ECHR), also used by the ECtHR to guarantee this right, 
together with article 3 of the ECHR, in the expulsion processes (European Court of 
Human Rights judgments of 21 January 2011, case of M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece; 
and of 22 April 2014, case of A.C. and others vs. Spain). The de facto expulsions make 
it impossible to access the immigration proceedings and, therefore, those expelled 
do not have the possibility of challenging the unlawfulness of their expulsion and 
the violation of their rights. 
6. In conclusion, there is no possibility to undergo any legislative amendment 
to provide legal basis to the “hot returns”, as they are being carried out at present, 
since they violate the European Union legislation and the international law on 
human rights, especially regarding the right to asylum and international legal 
protection, the prohibition of collective expulsions and the principle of non-
refoulement . 
 
VII. “Hot returns” and criminal law 
1. The unlawfulness of the so-called “hot returns” is conclusive based on the 
foregoing. Hence it must be analysed whether forcing a foreign citizen to exit 
Spanish territory without due regard to that established in laws is a conduct with 
criminal relevance. Therefore, we must conclude this report by stating in a non-
exhaustive manner some of the criminal figures under which “hot returns” could be 
included. 
2. Previously we must focus on the fact that due obedience cannot operate 
as a valid cause for justification of the criminal liability that this conduct could entail. 
The agents who execute or, in some way with their actions or omissions, favour 
“hot returns” or make them possible are not protected by due obedience. Article 
5.1.d) of Constitutional Law 2/1986, of 13 March, on the Law Enforcement 
Authorities, establishes that “in any case, due obedience cannot support orders 
that entail executing acts which manifestly constitute a felony or contravene the 
Constitution or the laws”. The exemption of acting to comply with a duty or in the 
legitimate exercise of a right, function or position (article 20.7 of the Criminal Code) 
cannot be used either since this would be applicable if such a duty came from the 
law itself or conformed to its provisions. 
3. The “hot returns” could fall within, firstly, article 172 of the Criminal Code, 
which punishes as the perpetrator of the coercion whoever, without being lawfully 
authorised, forces another to do something he does not want to do, where he can 
be punished with a sentence of imprisonment of one year and nine months to three 
years or with a fine of sixteen to twenty-four months. The punishment will be 
aggravated if the coercion is aimed at preventing the exercise of a fundamental 
right. 
For criminal law purposes, the aggravating circumstance envisaged in article 
22.7 of the Criminal Code would also be applicable. This occurs when the 
perpetrator of a felony avails himself of his public status; this would happen in this 
case since the members of the law enforcement authorities are the ones who 
execute such conduct protected by the authority that they represent. 
4. Articles 537 and subsequent of the Criminal Code envisage several criminal 
acts under the heading of “felonies committed by civil servants against other 
rights”. Article 537 of the Criminal Code establishes the penalty of a fine and special 
barring for the “authority or public officer who prevents or hinders a detainee or 
prisoner in the exercise of his right to legal counsel, who attempts or favours his 
renunciation to such counsel, or does not immediately inform him of his rights and 
of the reasons for his arrest in an understandable way”. When members of the law 
enforcement authorities return a migrant to Moroccan territory on a de facto basis, 
they are preventing him from exercising the rights that he could exercise if the 
procedures that are legally envisaged were carried out. The goal of article 537 of the 
Criminal Code is to protect the rights of detainees and prisoners and, clearly, the 
term detainee can be applied to  those who are deprived of their freedom within 
the devolution and expulsion proceedings and enjoy the rights to legal counsel and 
an interpreter (article 22.2 of the LOEX) or the right to file a habeas corpus petition 
(article 17.4 of the Spanish Constitution), without forgetting article 17.3 of the 
Spanish Constitution, whereby “every person arrested must be informed 
immediately, and in a way understandable to him or her, of his or her rights and of 
the grounds for his or her arrest, and may not be compelled to declare ”. Therefore, 
the conduct analysed by this report could fall within article 537 of the Criminal Code 
for the purposes of potential criminal liability. 
Nevertheless, if article 537 of the Criminal Code cannot be applied, article 542 
of that Code would be taken into consideration. This provision punishes the conduct 
that does not fall within the criminal types that precede it, with special barring from 
public employment and office for a term of one to four years to an authority or civil 
servant who knowingly prevents a person from exercising other civil rights 
recognised by the Spanish Constitution and the laws.  
5. Article 404 of the Criminal Code regulates the perversion of the course of 
justice by civil servants in the following way: “The authority or public officer who, 
being aware of the injustice thereof, were to hand down an arbitrary resolution in 
an administrative matter, shall be penalised with the punishment of special barring 
from public employment and office for a term of seven to ten years”. 
The requirement of a resolution does not prevent this felony from being 
assessed for this type of conduct since not only the written or formalised 
administrative acts or decisions are worthy of this consideration, but the tacit or de 
facto ones also require this. Therefore, the “hot returns” are administrative 
resolutions that fully dispense with the proceedings, thus incurring in the most 
serious defect: void ab initio, which would also support the unfair and arbitrary 
nature of that decision. If the “hot return” decision is made by a member or 
command of the law enforcement authorities, the perversion of the course of 
justice would also be supported by the lack of competence to adopt decisions 
regarding the expulsion or return of foreign citizens since their only task in this area 
is to enforce orders, in the case of the National Police Force, while the Civil Guard 
only has the competence to guard the borders but not to execute the devolution 
and expulsion resolutions. 
6. Regarding the possible criminal liability incurred as a result of the “hot 
returns”, we must remember the general principles of criminal law, where not only 
those directly executing the typical conduct are criminally liable, but also those who 
order or make them possible, in addition to the responsible parties or the superiors 
who, knowing of such practices, do not take any measures to stop this. From the 
latter’s standpoint, which corresponds to a conduct of criminal relevance  in terms 
of omission, the specific criminal importance of not reacting to the “hot returns” 
will depend on the position held by the omitting person. 
For such purposes, any person who witnesses a public felony (article 259 of 
the Criminal Procedure Law) or knows of it through other means (article 264) has 
the duty to report this and, if they know about a felony “because of their position, 
profession or trade” (article 262), such as the case of the Police or the Civil Guard 
itself, they are especially obliged to report this. Reporting the felony is a mere act of 
notifying the event, which does not require any formalities and which can be made 
at any judicial, prosecution or police authority. Failing to comply with this obligation 
is punished administratively with fines which, in the case of article 262 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law, are imposed as a disciplinary measure. 
Nevertheless, the omission or inaction regarding the “hot returns” can also 
constitute a felony. Article 450 of the Criminal Code punishes whoever is able to and 
does not prevent a felony from being committed that affects the life, integrity, 
health, freedom or sexual freedom of a person. Article 408 of the Criminal Code 
punishes the authority or public officer who, failing in the obligations of his office, 
intentionally ceases to foster the persecution of the felonies that he or his officers 
have obtained knowledge of. There is even the possibility of establishing the liability 
for commission of the felonies when the omitting person has the legal or 
contractual obligation to act or has created a risk for the right protected by law 
(article 11 Criminal Code). 
7. In view of the criminal liability that may be incurred in this type of conduct, 
the defence can plead that the perpetrators do not know about the unlawfulness of 
such practices, so the wilful misconduct required for some felonies would not exist, 
or that the subject has made an error in the prohibition. Such pleadings can be 
refuted by stating that the unlawfulness of the “hot returns” is proved on the basis 
of some evidence or circumstances, such as the type of practices carried out, 
because the unlawfulness of some of them is so obvious that any pleadings stating 
that they believed to be acting in accordance with the law would lack all credibility. 
Moreover, it is assumed that the authorities and agents in this area have knowledge 
of the basic immigration rules, and furthermore, it is a requirement for those 
entrusted to make the decision and execute the devolutions and expulsions of 
foreign citizens to do this. 
 
VIII. Conclusions 
1. “Hot returns” is the term coined popularly to the action carried out by the 
law enforcement authorities and consists of handing the foreign citizens who have 
been intercepted by those authorities in the area under Spanish sovereignty over to 
the Moroccan authorities on a de facto basis without carrying out the legally 
established procedures or meeting the internationally acknowledged guarantees. 
2. The “hot returns” breach the immigration legislation since (i) the 
immigration legislation does not envisage the possibility of the law enforcement 
authorities to expel foreign citizens under their custody on a de facto basis; (ii) the 
foreign citizens who try to enter Spanish territory through unauthorised posts and 
are intercepted at the border or in its vicinity can, at most, be returned in 
accordance with article 58.3.b) of the LOEx; and (iii) this return (devolution) is a 
regulated administrative act which needs a number of requirements to be met, such 
as the transfer of the foreign citizens to a police station (of the national police 
force), their identification, the appointment of a lawyer and, where applicable, an 
interpreter, a resolution for their devolution agreed by the Government Sub-
Delegate or Delegate, where applicable, and the devolution itself must be carried 
out by the national police force. 
3. The concept of an “operational” border used by the Spanish Ministry of 
the Interior, which considers this as the imaginary line formed by the Civil Guard 
agents on the Spanish beaches or that Spanish sovereignty starts when the internal 
protection fence is crossed in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, lacks legal grounds and 
is legally inadmissible to sustain the lawfulness of the so-called “hot returns” since 
(i) the concepts of border and territorial area under sovereignty are strictly legal 
and are regulated in the corresponding regulations, and the fiction of this 
“operational” border concept lacks legal basis; and (ii) any actions by the 
Administration inside or outside Spanish territory is carried out by Spanish civil 
servants in the exercise of  their duties which is  subject to the Spanish Constitution 
and other Spanish laws. In this sense, even if it is sustained that the foreign citizens 
are intercepted outside Spanish territory, the “hot returns” are not excluded from 
the immigration legislation since the foreign citizens are handed over by Spanish 
authorities from Spanish territory to the authorities of a third country. 
4. The interception in Spanish territory of people who have entered Spain 
irregularly through an unauthorised post does not justify applying the so-called “hot 
returns”. Conversely, in accordance with the Supreme Court case law on this issue, 
the expulsion proceedings are applicable in these cases, with their inherent 
guarantees 
5. The Spain-Morocco readmission agreement does not justify applying the 
so-called “hot returns” since it cannot make an exception, based on the issues it 
regulates, to applying the procedures established in the immigration legislation. 
Conversely, that Agreement establishes new obligations on how to hand over the 
foreign citizens, which are also not being complied with. 
6. There is no possibility to carry out a legislative amendment to provide legal 
basis to the “hot returns”, as they are being carried out at present, since they 
violate the Spanish Constitution, the European Union regulations and the 
international law on human rights, especially regarding the right to asylum and 
international legal protection, the prohibition of collective expulsions and the 
principle of non-refoulement. 
7. The active and passive decisions, executions and collaborations with the 
“hot returns” leads to criminal liability and disciplinary measures. This conduct can 
fall within several criminal liabilities, such as coercion (article 172 of the Criminal 
Code), the felonies by public officers by depriving legal counsel (article 537), 
depriving the exercise of other civil rights recognised in the Spanish Constitution 
and laws (article 540), and perversion of the course of justice (article 404). On the 
other hand, the excluding liability circumstances referring to due obedience, the 
legitimate exercise of the position or ignorance of the act’s unlawfulness cannot be 
applicable. Moreover, all citizens are obliged to report any felonies that they 
witness or which they have knowledge of (articles 259, 262 and 264 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law) and may even commit a felony in accordance with article 450 of the 
Criminal Code if, while being able to prevent such practices, they do not do this; 
whereas the authority or public officer who, failing in the obligations of his office, 
does not  foster the persecution of the felonies, commits a felony in accordance 
with article 408 of the Criminal Code.  
8. It is not possible to use any short cut that result in open contradiction to 
the Spanish, European and international regulations, which is what the Ministry of 
the Interior seems to be doing, on the pretext that this provides greater efficacy 
and efficiency to a migration policy that focuses mainly on controlling human flows, 
fostered mostly by a flagrant need. This violates the higher values of the Spanish 
Constitution and the most elementary ethical principles on which our culture is 
built. The rule of law requires that protecting human rights is the legitimate way in 
which institutions meet human needs. Violating such rights endangers not only the 
victims of this outrage but also compromises the moral dignity of our democracies 
and, especially, of those who, many times against their conscience, are forced to 
comply with manifestly unlawful orders which could lead to personal liabilities. As 
Nelson Mandela used to say, everything that includes the principle of negative 
discrimination in both politics and law ends up demeaning those who suffer it, and 
especially those who foster it or at least tolerate it. 
